THE SONS OF ISSACHAR

“The sons of Issachar,

men who understood the times,

with knowledge of what Israel should do…

and all their kinsmen were at their command.”

I Chronicles 12:32

From this brief passage we find a few precious keys for leadership in our own time. These sons of Issachar had cultivated a life posture that enabled them to live life with a heightened sense of seeing and discernment. They could perceive and grasp the significance of the movements of God in their world and therefore they could provide essential and crucial leadership. Because they, like David, understood the specific purpose of God for their own generation they became empowered to accomplish it.

We like these saints of old have a specific purpose of God for our generation and to accomplish that purpose, leadership of the same type as was manifested by the son sons Issachar is required.

This type of leadership, which is important in times of peace, becomes far more critical in seasons of significant transition or persecution and becomes absolutely essential in times of judgment.

They understood their times,

had knowledge of what to do,

therefore people followed.

The obvious contrast to this would be leaders or people who don’t understand the uniqueness of their times, they will not know what to do, and therefore will not be able to provide true leadership.

This tribe of Issachar is very much like the sons of Zadok (a division of priests addressed in Ezekiel 44) who had the capacity to not only inform and lead the people but also could CAUSE the people to distinguish the holy from the common (verse 33). This might be more clearly stated for our day by saying the sons of Zadok could see, perceive, discern, and interpret what was happening and what God was doing in the midst of life’s events. This was in contrast to the other priests who not only did not perceive the activity of God in the earth but were relegated to doing their own routine ministerial functions. They could not distinguish the things God had originated from their own endeavors, which were originated and sustained through the agency of their own efforts. If it is born in the heart of man, no matter how well intended, it can only touch the heart of man. If it is born from the heart of God it has the transcending power to lift the heart of man to the design of God. That’s why Paul strove not to be eloquent or polished. In fact he put his best foot behind him so that all would see only God. He wanted a demonstration of the power of God, not an oratorical presentation.

What was it about the lives of the sons of Zadok that CAUSED OR FORCED the contrast to be seen? If you read the entire chapter of 44 you will see a most amazing thing as God contrasted these leaders who stood before the Lord and those that stood before the people. The sons of Zadok lived before the presence of God in such a way that they could see what God was doing and lead the people in the right direction. God contrasted them to the common leaders of their day who stood before and whose primary focus was ministering to the people. The chapter ends by saying the leaders who only operated in the “common” or natural realm came under a judgment in which their life was from then on forced to stay in ministry but only to minister to the people while being barred from coming into the presence of the Lord.

So what does this have to do with end time leadership? EVERYTHING. Part of the church will be like the sons of Issachar and have Godly leaders and people who stand in the presence of the Lord. They have now and will have then discernment and the capacity to understand the times and know what to do in changing situations.

Another part of the overall broader American church will have a leadership much like the common priests who will have to attend to the common or the natural level with very little or no revelatory leading or directives. It will be like the blind leading the blind. Their lives and their churches will have developed a lifestyle and a structure of life based on the natural or what man can do.

They won’t understand their time. They will simply see an increase in unrelated environmental disasters, increasing terrorist activity, a far distant problem between Iran and Israel, a weakening dollar, global solutions to what once were sovereign issues. They will simply live the American life style just like the people in Noah’s day. And just as Jesus said of Noah’s time, they will make no adjustments to their entangled, busy, busy lifestyles right up until the rain started to fall.

Then they will scramble to “find oil”. They will need “another” brief time out to go get more oil. All to no avail. As believers we are basically in one of two camps. Our life either has the hallmarks of a son of Issachar and we are seeking to understand these times and live a holy, sanctified and well-placed life for God, or our life looks just like those who have no such awareness. Who go to church and definitely know God, but in understanding the season we are in are not much different than the world where life just goes on.

It is a time to “Be on guard, that your hearts may not be weighted down with dissipation and drunkenness and the worries of life, and that day come on you suddenly like a trap; for it will come upon all those who dwell on the face of the earth” (Luke 21:34-36).

WE ARE GOING TO ENTER A TIME

WHEN ONLY THOSE WHO UNDERSTAND THE TIMES

WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO.

We can do all kinds of things in times of peace that will be impossible in times of great stress. In peaceful days when man is prone to be dull prophetically, leadership is much easier. In times of difficulty following leaders who have no insight is very difficult. Then manmade church programs won’t suffice. In those types of times many people may be forced to seek out prophetic leadership.

The unique position of the church in the last days is of utmost importance.

Saints living at this time must of all generations

be able to discern and speak

with kingdom-splitting clarity.

God intends for the last generation to be so close to Him, so refined, so separated from the world that they would literally be able to DISTRIBUTE UNDERSTANDING. This particular verse isn’t referring to a few prophets or apostles but to the nature of the mature saint in those days.

“But the people who know their God

will display strength and take action.

And those who have insight among the people

will give understanding to the many”

Daniel 11:32-33

Jesus said of these days of upheaval, “It will lead to an opportunity for your testimony” (Luke 21:13). These will be the days of unparalleled opportunity for sharing the gospel with a lost and confused world. Most of us have encountered a friend or family member who has been in an auto accident or been informed of some unanticipated life-threatening illness. Suddenly their whole world collapses and they have an earnest interest in God and eternal things. While all is going well man is prone to just keep up with whatever he wraps his life around. In those days of massive hostility toward God, millions will sober up and turn to Him as they see everything start to fall apart.

In God’s blueprint for the last days the saints will show tremendous strength and courage and will be positioned to dispense truth and life to those who will receive it. Even in the midst of laying down their lives for the gospel they won’t be a timid, cowering bunch. They will be so full of zeal and boldness that the Word says they will do exploits, heroic feats of action for God.

There will be such a level of personal strength and insight that the Bible says some unbelievers will even pretend to be Christians for a short while. “Many will join with them in hypocrisy”(Daniel 11:34), because they will have wisdom about such things as local disasters, famines, environmental disaster, and the severe incurable plagues. They will understand their times and will have knowledge of what to do.

These saints will take action; they will be proactive. Amidst all of the confusion they will be so full of discernment concerning their situation that they will literally be able to give understanding away to a lost and confused world.

Individual cities, communities, neighborhoods, churches, and families, will need a people who walk with God and understand His ways, people who can in the midst of their own confusing and bewildering circumstances be able to bring clarity as well as conviction to bear upon the hearts of the unbeliever.

The consummate tragedy of church history would be if the final generation would arrive upon the precipitous and cataclysmic events preceding His return without understanding, still entrenched in the world, leavened and lukewarm close enough to God to know better but too far away from God that they cannot see what is coming. A people rich in their own eyes, living casually in their prosperity, a people strong of soul but dull of spirit. You are now being prepared to be His voice to many who will have new reason to listen. Don’t be caught running to and fro trying to find understanding as Saul did at the end of his life…

Find understanding now;

live an understanding life now!

It is a time to “Be on guard, that your hearts may not be weighted down with dissipation and drunkenness and the worries of life, and that day come on you suddenly like a trap; for it will come upon all those who dwell on the face of the earth” (Luke 21:34-36).

Break up your fallow ground...” For it is time to seek the Lord until He comes to rain righteousness on you” (Hosea 10:12). (examine our works to assess what might not endure the fire; check our lamps to see how much oil we have; scrutinize our hearts to see what affections might betray us when the chips are down)

“... It is time to “Arm [ourselves] with the same purpose [as Christ who suffered in the flesh]… so as to live the rest of the time in the flesh no longer for the lusts of men… but for the will of God.” (Peter 4:1.2). “Since all these things are to be destroyed in this way, what sort of people ought [we] to be in a holy conduct and godliness, looking for and hastening the coming of the day of God, … therefore, Beloved, since you look for these things, be diligent to be found by Him in peace, spotless and blameless, and regard the patience of our Lord to be salvation…” (I Peter 3:11,12,14,15).

PRESIDENTS & THE U.S. STRATEGY OF BUYING TIME

The following article appeared in the Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Report. It is very good at providing insights into international actions being taken by America. And a 50,000 foot view of empire building.

Obama and the U.S. Strategy of Buying Time

November 2, 2009 By George Friedman

Making sense of U.S. President Barack Obama's strategy at this moment is difficult. Not only is it a work in progress, but the pending decisions he has to make -- on Iran, Afghanistan and Russia -- tend to obscure underlying strategy. It is easy to confuse inaction with a lack of strategy. Of course, there may well be a lack of strategic thinking, but that does not mean there is a lack of strategy.

Strategy, as we have argued, is less a matter of choice than a matter of reality imposing itself on presidents. Former U.S. President George W. Bush, for example, rarely had a chance to make strategy. He was caught in a whirlwind after only nine months in office and spent the rest of his presidency responding to events, making choices from a menu of very bad options. Similarly, Obama came into office with a preset menu of limited choices. He seems to be fighting to create new choices, not liking what is on the menu. He may succeed. But it is important to understand the overwhelming forces that shape his choices and to understand the degree to which whatever he chooses is embedded in U.S. grand strategy, a strategy imposed by geopolitical reality.

Empires and Grand Strategy

American grand strategy, as we have argued, is essentially that of the British Empire, save at a global rather than a regional level. The British sought to protect their national security by encouraging Continental powers to engage in land-based conflict, thereby reducing resources available for building a navy. That guaranteed that Britain's core interest, the security of the homeland and sea-lane control, remained intact. Achieving this made the United Kingdom an economic power in the 19th century by sparing it the destruction of war and allowing it to control the patterns of international maritime trade.

On occasion, when the balance of power in Europe tilted toward one side or another, Britain intervened on the Continent with political influence where possible, direct aid when necessary or -- when all else failed -- the smallest possible direct military intervention. The United Kingdom's preferred strategy consisted of imposing a blockade -- e.g., economic sanctions -- allowing it to cause pain without incurring costs.

At the same time that it pursued this European policy, London was building a global empire. Here again, the British employed a balance-of-power strategy. In looking at the history of India or Africa during the 19th century, there is a consistent pattern of the United Kingdom forming alliances with factions, whether religious or ethnic groups, to create opportunities for domination. In the end, this was not substantially different from ancient Rome's grand strategy. Rome also ruled indirectly through much of its empire, controlling Mediterranean sea-lanes, but allying with local forces to govern; observing Roman strategy in Egypt is quite instructive in this regard.

Empires are not created by someone deciding one day to build one, or more precisely, lasting empires are not. They emerge over time through a series of decisions having nothing to do with empire building, and frequently at the hands of people far more concerned with domestic issues than foreign policy. Paradoxically, leaders who consciously set out to build empires usually fail. Hitler is a prime example. His failure was that rather than ally with forces in the Soviet Union, he wished to govern directly, something that flowed from his ambitions for direct rule. Particularly at the beginning, the Roman and British empires were far less ambitious and far less conscious of where they were headed. They were primarily taking care of domestic affairs. They became involved in foreign policy as needed, following a strategy of controlling the seas while maintaining substantial ground forces able to prevail anywhere -- but not everywhere at once -- and a powerful alliance system based on supporting the ambitions of local powers against other local powers.

On the whole, the United States has no interest in empire, and indeed is averse to imperial adventures. Those who might have had explicit inclinations in this direction are mostly out of government, crushed by experience in Iraq. Iraq came in two parts. In the first part, from 2003 to 2007, the U.S. vision was one of direct rule relying on American sea-lane control and overwhelming Iraq with well-supplied American troops. The results were unsatisfactory. The United States found itself arrayed against all Iraqi factions and wound up in a multipart war in which its forces were merely one faction arrayed against others. The Petraeus strategy to escape this trap was less an innovation in counterinsurgency than a classic British-Roman approach. Rather than attempting direct control of Iraq, Petraeus sought to manipulate the international balance of power, aligning with Sunni forces against Shiite forces, i.e., allying with the weaker party at that moment against the stronger. The strategy did not yield the outcome that some Bush strategists dreamed of, but it might (with an emphasis on might) yield a useful outcome: a precariously balanced Iraq dependent on the United States to preserve its internal balance of power and national sovereignty against Iran.

Many Americans, perhaps even most, regret the U.S. intervention in Iraq. And there are many, again perhaps most, who view broader U.S. entanglement in the world as harmful to American interests. Similar views were expressed by Roman republicans and English nationalists who felt that protecting the homeland by controlling the sea was the best policy, while letting the rest of the world go its own way. But the Romans and the British lost that option when they achieved the key to their own national security: enough power to protect the homeland. Outsiders inevitably came to see that power as offensive, even though originally its possessors intended it as defensive. Indeed, intent aside, the capability for offensive power was there. So frequently, Rome and Britain threatened the interests of foreign powers simply by being there. Inevitably, both Rome and Britain became the targets of Hannibals and Napoleons, and they were both drawn into the world regardless of their original desires. In short, enough power to be secure is enough power to threaten others. Therefore, that perfect moment of national security always turns offensive, as the power to protect the homeland threatens the security of other countries.

A Question of Size

There are Obama supporters and opponents who also dream of the perfect balance: security for the United States achieved by not interfering in the affairs of others. They see foreign entanglements not as providing homeland security, but as generating threats to it. They do not understand that what they want, American prosperity without international risks, is by definition impossible. The U.S. economy is roughly 25 percent of the world's economy. The American military controls the seas, not all at the same time, but anywhere it wishes at any given time. The United States also controls outer space. It is impossible for the United States not to intrude on the affairs of most countries in the world simply by virtue of its daily operations. The United States is an elephant that affects the world simply by being in the same room with it. The only way to not be an elephant is to shrink in size, and whether the United States would ever want this aside, decreasing power is harder to do than it might appear -- and much more painful.

Obama's challenge is managing U.S. power without decreasing its size and without imposing undue costs on it. This sounds like an attractive idea, but it ultimately won't work: The United States cannot be what it is without attracting hostile attention. For some of Obama's supporters, it is American behavior that generates hostility. Actually, it is America's presence -- its very size -- that intrudes on the world and generates hostility.

On the domestic front, the isolationist-internationalist divide in the United States has always been specious. Isolationists before World War II simply wanted to let the European balance of power manage itself. They wanted to buy time, but had no problem with intervening in China against Japan. The internationalists simply wanted to move from the first to the second stage, arguing that the first stage had failed. There was thus no argument in principle between them; there was simply a debate over how much time to give the process to see if it worked out. Both sides had the same strategy, but simply a different read of the moment. In retrospect, Franklin Roosevelt was right, but only because France collapsed in the face of the Nazi onslaught in a matter of weeks. That aside, the isolationist argument was quite rational.

Like that of Britain or Rome, U.S. grand strategy is driven by the sheer size of the national enterprise, a size achieved less through planning than by geography and history. Having arrived where it has, the United States has three layers to its strategy.

First, the United States must maintain the balance of power in various regions in the world. It does this by supporting a range of powers, usually the weaker against the stronger. Ideally, this balance of power maintains itself without American effort and yields relative stability. But stability is secondary to keeping local powers focused on each other rather than on the United States: Stability is a rhetorical device, not a goal. The real U.S. interest lies in weakening and undermining emergent powers so they don't ultimately rise to challenge American power. This is a strategy of nipping things in the bud.

Second, where emergent powers cannot be maintained through the regional balance of power, the United States has an interest in sharing the burden of containing it with other major powers. The United States will seek to use such coalitions either to intimidate the emerging power via economic power or, in extremis, via military power.

Third, where it is impossible to build a coalition to coerce emerging powers, the United States must decide either to live with the emerging power, forge an alliance with it, or attack it unilaterally.

Obama, as with any president, will first pursue the first layer of the strategy, using as little American power as possible and waiting as long as possible to see whether this works. The key here lies in not taking premature action that could prove more dangerous or costly than necessary. If that fails, his strategy is to create a coalition of powers to share the cost and risk. And only when that fails -- which is a function of time and politics -- will Obama turn to the third layer, which can range from simply living with the emerging power and making a suitable deal or crushing it militarily.

When al Qaeda attacked what it saw as the leading Christian power on Sept. 11, Bush found himself thrown into the third stage very rapidly. The second phase was illusory; sympathy aside, the quantity of military force allies could and would bring to bear was minimal. Even active allies like Britain and Australia couldn't bring decisive force to bear. Bush was forced into unilateralism not so much by the lack of will among allies as by their lack of power. His choice lay in creating chaos in the Islamic world and then forming alliances out of the debris, or trying to impose a direct solution through military force. He began with the second and shifted to the first.

Obama’s Choices

Obama has more room to maneuver than Bush had. In the case of Iran, no regional solution is possible. Israel can only barely reach into the region, and while its air force might suffice to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, and air attacks might be sufficient to destroy them, Israel could not deal with the Iranian response of mining the Strait of Hormuz and/or destabilizing Iraq. The United States must absorb these blows.

Therefore, Obama has tried to build an anti-Iranian coalition to intimidate Tehran. Given the Russian and Chinese positions, This seems to have failed and Iran has not been intimidated. That leaves Obama with two possible paths. One is the path followed by Nixon in China: ally with Iran against Russian influence, accepting it as a nuclear power and dealing with it through a combination of political alignment and deterrence. The second option is dealing with Iran militarily.

His choice thus lies between entente or war. He is bluffing war in hopes of getting what he wants, in the meantime hoping that internal events in Iran may evolve in a way suitable to U.S. interests or that Russian economic hardship evolves into increased Russian dependence on the United States such that Washington can extract Russian concessions on Iran. Given the state of Iran's nuclear development, Obama is using time to try to head off the third stage.

In Afghanistan, where Obama is already in the third stage and where he is being urged to go deeper in, he is searching for a way to return to the first stage, wherein an indigenous coalition emerges that neutralizes Afghanistan through its own internal dynamic. Hence, Washington is negotiating with the Taliban, trying to strengthen various factions in Afghanistan and not quite committing to more force. Winter is coming in Afghanistan, and that is the quiet time in that conflict. Obama is clearly buying time.

In that sense, Obama's foreign policy is neither as alien as his critics would argue nor as original as his supporters argue. He is adhering to the basic logic of American grand strategy, minimizing risks over time while seeking ways to impose low-cost solutions. It differs from Bush's policies primarily in that Bush had events forced on him and spent his presidency trying to regain the initiative.

The interesting point from where we sit is not only how deeply embedded Obama is in U.S. grand strategy, but how deeply drawn he is into the unintended imperial enterprise that has dominated American foreign policy since the 1930s -- an enterprise neither welcomed nor acknowledged by most Americans. Empires aren't planned, at least not successful empires, as Hitler and Napoleon learned to their regret. Empires happen as the result of the sheer reality of power. The elephant in the room cannot stop being an elephant, nor can the smaller animals ignore him. No matter how courteous the elephant, it is his power -- his capabilities -- not his intentions that matter.

Obama is now the elephant in the room. He has bought as much time as possible to make decisions, and he is being as amiable as possible to try to build as large a coalition as possible. But the coalition has neither the power nor appetite for the risks involved, so Obama will have to decide whether to live with Iran, form an alliance with Iran or go to war with Iran. In Afghanistan, he must decide whether he can recreate the balance of power by staying longer and whether this will be more effective by sending more troops, or whether it is time to begin withdrawal. In both cases, he can use the art of the bluff to shape the behavior of others, maybe.

He came into the presidency promising to be more amiable than Bush, something not difficult given the circumstances. He is now trying to convert amiability into a coalition, a much harder thing to do. In the end, he will have to make hard decisions. In American foreign policy, however, the ideal strategy is always to buy time so as to let the bribes, bluffs and threats do their work. Obama himself probably doesn't know what he will do; that will depend on circumstances. Letting events flow until they can no longer be tolerated is the essence of American grand strategy, a path Obama is following faithfully.

It should always be remembered that this long-standing American policy has frequently culminated in war, as with Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson and Bush. It was Clinton's watchful waiting to see how things played out, after all, that allowed al Qaeda the time to build and strike. But this is not a criticism of Clinton -- U.S. strategy is to trade time for risk. Over time, the risk might lead to war anyway, but then again, it might not. If war does come, American power is still decisive, if not in creating peace, then certainly in wreaking havoc upon rising powers. And that is the foundation of empire.